


And we are here as on a darkling plain
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and
flight,
Where ignorant armies clash by night.

- Matthew Arnold, 'Dover
Beach'

Global Conflict Death Tolls

1990-2007

Source: Virgil Hawkins, *Stealth Conflicts: How the World's Worst Violence is Ignored* (Ashgate, 2008)




UCDP Armed Conflicts

Source: Uppsala Conflict Database and Geo-referenced Event Dataset (<http://ucdp.uu.se/ged/>)



Current Conflicts



Geolocated Conflict Deaths, 1945-2010


African Wars and Conflicts

1945-2010

Source: Nobel Foundation (


<http://www.nobelprize.org/educational/peace/conflictmap/conflictmap.html>)

(Data drawn from UCDP and Correlates of War Project)




Failed States Index 2010

Source: Fund for Peace Failed States Index (<http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi>)



UCDP Armed Conflicts, 1989-2010

Source: UCDP (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/charts_and_graphs/)



Questions for Current Scholarship

- If African war is overwhelmingly 'civil', then:
 - Are states pacifistic, constrained, or incapable?
 - Are states in more danger from within than without?
 - Does war primarily stem from ungoverned spaces?
- What is the origin (and what are the characteristics) of the complex state-nonstate alliances frequently observed in African war?

A New Dataset: “Multi-Actor War Event List”


- UCDP-PRIO dataset: 3+ actors, 1+ states, in Africa
- Excluded wars not featuring an African government
- Compare to Correlates: 30% wars, 70% CDY, 100% severe
- Included ‘crises’ (B&W) to capture *potential* wars
- Final population: 27 events, 101 relationships

Rival Hypotheses

- “States form partnerships with non-states in order to plunder conflict minerals”
- “States form partnerships with threatened co-ethnics or co-religionists across arbitrary colonial borders”
- “States form partnerships with non-states to securitize the border regions of their weak neighbors”

The Sponsors

- 47 African states included in my dataset
- 96% have used proxies at least




- Most frequent goal: destruction of rivals
- Most frequent tool: provision of

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
Sponsor goal	Level I (e.g. invasion)	Level II (e.g. shelling)	Level III (e.g. arms)	Level IV (e.g. training)	Level V (e.g. camps)
Destroy target regime	14%	11%	50%	48%	52%
Support target regime	29%	56%	0%	0%	0%
Support target faction	36%	33%	28%	14%	10%
Implement secession	21%	0%	22%	38%	38%
n = 101	14	9	36	21	21

Dark shaded areas represent instances in which a majority (or, near-majority) of the PRs that featured a particular level of support were associated with a particular military objective.





For partnerships involving the transfer of arms, training or troops, weak states are no less prolific sponsors than strong ones.

Since 1950, strong- and weak-state sponsorship profiles have been converging



The Targets

- 66% of African states have been targets
- 42% more than once; 20% more than 5 times
- No clear links between being targeted and:
 - Presence of Minorities at Risk (MAR)
 - High index for 'Lootability' (WDI)
 - Military strength or weakness (COW)
 - Territorial Contiguity with Sponsor



Three Exemplar Wars

- **Somali Vortex** (1973-present)
- **The Border War** (1975-1994)
- **Toyota Wars** (1971-1994)

Constraints

Physical Place

Human Space

1. Distance

Definition: The proximity of the sponsor to the target and the proxy.

3. Borders

Definition: Juridical limits on state sovereignty.

2. Terrain

Definition: The physical characteristics (vegetation, rainfall, disease patterns, etc.) of the conflict area

4. Human Settlement

Definition: The economic, lifestyle, subsistence, and sociocultural patterns present in the conflict area

The sponsoring state militarizes ...

... people/groups, by

...arming them

E.g. provision of weapons (guns, vehicles, machetes)

...agitating them

E.g. use of broadcast propaganda, aid in founding rebel groups

... mobilizing them

E.g. provision of trainers, advisors, leaders, liaisons

... places/spaces, by

...denying them to the enemy

E.g. depopulation; use of terrain denial tactics (landmines and air defense systems); de-legitimization

... zoning them for battle

E.g. declaration of certain areas as 'fronts,' objectives, or free-fire zones; identification of the enemy


MAW as Proxy War: A New Model

1. **ADVENT:** the advent of a PR signals the start of *focused hostilities*
 2. **ACTORS:** the parties to this PR fall into the tripartite division which I proposed, i.e. sponsors (the actors who extend concrete support to proxies so as to facilitate an attack on a potential target); proxies (who accept this support in some or other form of agreement); and targets (who enter the PR when its designated representatives respond to or clash with the proxies)
 3. **SUPPORT:** the levels and nature of support which the sponsor commits to their proxies, serve as a clear signal of the commitment of the sponsor to the war
 4. **CONSTRAINTS:** the aim of the PR is to overcome particular constraints such as existing vulnerabilities and or sources of conflict/violence *outside* the sovereign boundaries of the sponsor, and specific opportunities for exploitation in the form of places and people, through the militarization of these
 5. **SYSTEM:** the constitutive dynamics of system (interactions between sponsor(s) + proxies + target(s)) keep a continent-wide system of PW going between states in Africa.
6. **EFFECTIVE TOOL:** the use of proxy war follows on from its *nature* as an effective tool for participating in African conflicts (flexibility, concurrency, modularizability, suitability to conditions, responsiveness to global networks).


Checking Findings against Model

	EVENTS LIST (101 PRs across 27 conflicts)	THE TOYOTA WARS	THE BORDER WAR	THE SOMALI VORTEX
1: Advent	Not conclusive	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed
2: Actors in PR	Confirmed	Confirmed	Not conclusive	Not conclusive
3: Levels and nature of support	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed	Not conclusive
4: Overcoming constraints	No data	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed
5: System in Balance	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed
6: Effective tool	No data	Confirmed	Confirmed	Confirmed


Model Refinements I



Model Refinements II



Model Refinements: The “Sovereign Interstice”








Figure 2: Some inhabitants of the wartime Sovereign Interstice

Center advantage in
coercive terms



Periphery
provides


- + border
defense
- + tribute to
center
- + auxiliaries
- + elite
transfer



- Center
provides
- + goods
 - + military
 - + new lands
 - + law
 - + elite
transfer



Frontier Depth



Conclusions

- Multi-Actor Wars in Africa are proxy wars: the 'continuation of politics by other means'
- The origins of this form of war are the particular geopolitical configurations of the African state since independence, not 'ungoverned spaces'
- State responses to these configurations have made proxy war a continent-wide system
- Policy responses to complex wars should focus on de-incentivizing sponsors, not securitizing targets